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SPAM-A-LOT: THE STATES’ CRUSADE 
AGAINST UNSOLICITED E-MAIL IN  
LIGHT OF THE CAN-SPAM ACT  
AND THE OVERBREADTH  
DOCTRINE 
Abstract: The ever-increasing deluge of unsolicited e-mail, or spam, results 
in millions of dollars of economic loss, fosters criminal activity, causes un-
told user frustration, and threatens to undermine the viability of e-mail as 
a communication medium. Attempts to stem this tide have thus far been 
unavailing. The arrival of federal regulation on the scene has not helped 
matters and, by thwarting earlier state regulation, has created an intracta-
ble conflict. On the one hand, narrowly focused state anti-spam laws are 
now preempted by the federal act. On the other hand, broad attempts to 
regulate spam, although escaping preemption, collide directly with the 
First Amendment. This Note examines the marginal regulatory area left in 
place at the intersection of federal regulation and constitutional bounda-
ries. It further reexamines several assumptions underlying the current case 
law and regulation of spam, and suggests that altering these assumptions 
may enable new approaches to deal with this pervasive problem. 
Introduction 
 Unsolicited bulk electronic mail, otherwise known as spam,1 is al-
most as old as the Internet itself.2 Spam routinely frustrates and annoys 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Adam Hamel, Note, Will the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 Finally Put a Lid on Unsolicited 
E-mail?, 39 New Eng. L. Rev. 961, 963 (2005). There is some debate as to the actual defini-
tion of spam: whether it constitutes any unsolicited electronic mail (e-mail), unsolicited 
bulk e-mail, or only unsolicited commercial e-mail. See id.; David E. Sorkin, Technical and 
Legal Approaches to Unsolicited Electronic Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. Rev. 325, 327–36 (2001); see also 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1430 (8th ed. 2004) (defining spam as unsolicited commercial 
e-mail); Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0, at 388 n.64 (2d ed. 2007) (suggesting that 
all three elements—unsolicited, bulk, and commercial—are necessary to the definition of 
spam). This Note uses spam to refer generally to unsolicited bulk e-mail (“UBE”) and will 
refer to commercial spam where greater specificity is required. Cf. Hamel, supra, at 963–64. 
Spam is believed to have received its name from a skit by the British sketch-comedy troupe 
Monty Python. See id. at 963 n.18. In the skit, a restaurant served only Spam—the canned 
meat product from Hormel—and most menu items included Spam, such as “Spam, Spam, 
Spam, eggs, and Spam.” See Monty Python: Spam (BBC television broadcast Dec. 15, 1970), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anwy2MPT5RE. The frequency and repeti-
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users,3 wastes both time and network resources,4 and results in relevant 
messages being drowned out in the noise of unwanted, irrelevant, and 
oftentimes, fraudulent advertisements.5 Far from being a mere nui-
sance, spam can be downright malicious, tricking less than savvy com-
puter users into giving out their bank passwords, credit card informa-
tion,6 and even sending money to overseas dupers.7 
                                                                                                                      
tive quality of unsolicited bulk e-mail was similar to the mindless repetition of the word 
“spam” in the skit and the name stuck. See Hamel, supra, at 963 n.18. 
2 See Katie Hafner, Billions Served Daily and Counting, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2001, at G1 
(describing the creation of the first e-mail program by a scientist at a Cambridge engineer-
ing firm in 1971). The first spam is widely believed to have been sent in 1978 on a network 
called the Arpanet, which was developed by the Department of Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency and was a precursor to the modern Internet. See Andrew S. Ta-
nenbaum, Computer Networks 56 (4th ed. 2002). The message was an advertisement 
sent by an employee of Digital Equipment Corporation, and the reaction to it was gener-
ally not favorable, not the least because the e-mail message strained the limited network 
resources of Arpanet and slowed down other communication. See Jonathan A. Zdziarski, 
Ending Spam 4–6 (2005). Spam made its resurgence in the early 1990s, most notably be-
cause of a husband and wife team of attorneys, who sent out an unsolicited message to 
roughly 6000 newsgroups advertising their legal services. See id. at 10. The advertisement 
generated nearly $100,000 for the attorneys. See Hamel, supra note 1, at 965. Some com-
mentators consider this event to be the actual birth of spam. See, e.g., Roger Allan Ford, 
Comment, Preemption of State Spam Laws by the Federal CAN-SPAM Act, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 355, 
355 n.1 (2005). 
3 See Memorandum from Deborah Fellows, PIP Senior Research Fellow, on CAN-SPAM 
a Year Later to Pew Internet & American Life Project 2 (Apr. 10, 2005), available at http:// 
www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2005/PIP_Spam_Ap05.pdf.pdf (“67% of 
email users say spam has made being online unpleasant or annoying . . . .”). 
4 See Cisco Systems, Annual Security Report 13 (2008), available at http://www. 
cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/vpndevc/securityreview12–2.pdf (finding about 100 
billion messages per day, approximately eighty-five percent of all e-mail, to be spam). 
5 See S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 2 (2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2348–49 (re-
citing the pervasiveness along with the generally fraudulent and misleading nature of un-
solicited e-mail). 
6 See Jasmine E. McNealy, Angling for Phishers: Legislative Responses to Deceptive E-Mail, 13 
Comm. L. & Pol’y 275, 275 (2008). The practice of “phishing” is a serious problem that 
stems from spam. Phishing consists of sending e-mail messages resembling those from well-
known companies, such as banks, credit card providers, and online payment sites, in the 
hopes that the recipients click on the hyperlink in the message. See id. at 276. The hyperlink 
takes the unwitting recipient to a website designed to look like a legitimate website of that 
particular business, and will prompt the user to enter their confidential information, such as 
passwords and account numbers. See id. That information is then used to defraud the user. See 
id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of Just., Report on Phishing 5 (2006), available at http://www.us 
doj.gov/opa/report_on_phishing.pdf (citing statistics that as many as 20,000 phishing com-
plaints were reported in August of 2006 alone, an 89% increase from the previous year). 
Phishing is integrally linked to spam, using unsolicited e-mail as a way to “lure” unsuspecting 
users to these impostor websites. See id. at 6. 
7 See Mitchell Zuckoff, The Perfect Mark: How a Massachusetts Psychotherapist Fell for a Nige-
rian E-mail Scam, New Yorker, May 15, 2006, at 36–43. (explaining how a fifty-seven year 
old ordained minister and Christian psychotherapist lost more than $40,000 and was sen-
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 As electronic mail (“e-mail”) and the Internet have become more 
and more popular, spam has proliferated at an exponential rate.8 Nei-
ther technological nor legal attempts to curb spam appear to have had 
any significant or lasting impact.9 The majority of states and, more re-
cently, Congress have attempted to regulate spam, but their efforts so 
far have been met with limited success.10 The difficulties in trying to 
stop spam and catch its senders (known as spammers) stem from both 
technological and legislative challenges.11 The technological challenges 
arise in part because spammers are very good at hiding themselves, of-
ten using viruses and other malware to take over computers of users 
and trick them into sending more spam.12 The legislative efforts are 
complicated by the uncertainty of laws in this area and the difficulties 
enforcing these laws.13 
 States have attempted to regulate and limit spam without much 
success.14 Congress also jumped into the fray in 2003, with the enact-
ment of the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and 
                                                                                                                      
tenced to two years in prison after he fell victim to a spam e-mail containing an advance-
fee fraud, a swindle whose victims are asked to provide money, information, or services in 
exchange for a share of a promised fortune). 
8 See S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 2, reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2349 (“The volume 
of spam . . . today accounts for over 46 percent of all global e-mail traffic. . . . [I]n Septem-
ber 2001, spam only accounted for 8 percent of all e-mail sent . . . .”). 
9 See Lessig, supra note 1, at 262–64 (“[T]here’s no good evidence the pollution of 
spam is abating.”). 
10 See, e.g., John Soma et al., Spam Still Pays: The Failure of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 and 
Proposed Legal Solutions, 45 Harv. J. on Legis. 165, 165–66 (2008); Ford, supra note 2, at 
356; Hamel, supra note 1, at 961. 
11 See David Dickinson, Note, An Architecture for Spam Regulation, 57 Fed. Comm. L.J. 
129, 130–31 (2004). 
12 See Ken Dunham & Jim Melnick, Malicious Bots: An Inside Look into the Cyber-
Criminal Underground of the Internet 1–4 (2009). Viruses and Trojans—malicious 
programs masquerading as legitimate software—may carry software that allows a remote user 
to exploit the infected computer, turning it into a “zombie.” See id. at 4. Such zombies, also 
known as “bots,” are then grouped into “botnets” —large networks of compromised com-
puters that can be controlled by a single individual. See id at 1. These computers can then be 
used for any number of nefarious purposes, such as stealing the unsuspecting victims’ credit 
card information, bringing down websites through denial of service attacks, and sending 
spam. See id. at 57, 58, 63. Spammers may even rent botnets, for as little as $4000 a month. See 
id. at 65; see also Consumer Reports, Protect Yourself Online, State of the Net ’07: 
Net Threats—Why Going Online Remains Risky 28 (Sept. 2007) (explaining how net-
works of hijacked computers are used to send the majority of spam). 
13 See generally Rita Marie Cain, When Does Preemption Not Really Preempt? The Role of State 
Law After CAN-SPAM, 3 I/S: J.L. & Pol’y for Info. Soc’y 751 (2008); Michael Bailey, 
Comment, The Spam Sham of White Buffalo Ventures: A Proposal for Cities and Municipalities 
to Regulate Spam on a Public Network, 56 Cath. U. L. Rev. 609 (2007); Ford, supra note 2. 
14 See Ford, supra note 2, at 379. 
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Marketing (“CAN-SPAM”) Act.15 The Act sought to create a uniform, 
nationwide set of regulations governing unsolicited commercial e-
mail.16 To achieve its goals, the Act preempts some, but not all, state law 
addressing unsolicited e-mail.17 The Act preempts mild regulation of 
spam by the states, substituting in its place a nationwide framework of 
provisions that senders have to follow.18 The Act also removes private 
causes of action and vests enforcement powers with the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), the states and their attorneys general, and pri-
vate Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”).19 
 Many critics consider the CAN-SPAM Act ineffective because it not 
only fails to prohibit or restrict the assault of spam itself, but, by pre-
empting state regulation, it also deprives states of the ability to regulate 
spam.20 These critics suggest that unfettered state regulation would 
stimulate growth and innovation in fighting spam because it would al-
low states to experiment with different solutions to this problem.21 The 
Act, however, does contain an exemption provision, potentially leaving 
some state laws in place to create stronger remedies for combating 
spam.22 The scope of the exemption, and therefore the extent of per-
missible state regulation, remains unclear.23 
 Additionally, the First Amendment may further limit the power of 
both the states and the federal government to regulate unsolicited e-
mail.24 A recent ruling by the Supreme Court of Virginia struck down a 
Virginia statute that criminalized sending unsolicited bulk e-mail be-
cause it violated the First Amendment.25 The statute in question was 
                                                                                                                      
15 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7701–7713 (2006). 
16 See id. § 7701 (setting out congressional findings and policy). 
17 See generally Ford, supra note 2. 
18 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (expressly superseding any state statutes that regulate the 
use of electronic mail to send commercial messages). 
19 15 U.S.C. § 7706(d),(f),(g). 
20 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 1, at 264 (“The only federal legislative response, the 
CAN-SPAM Act, while preempting many innovative state solutions, is not having any sig-
nificant effect.”). 
21 See Cain, supra note 13, at 775, 776. 
22 15 U.S.C § 7707(b)(1),(2) (2006) (“This chapter supersedes any statute, regulation, 
or rule of a State . . . except to the extent that any such statute, regulation, or rule prohib-
its falsity or deception . . . .”). The exemption provision is called a “savings clause” by some 
commentators. See Ford, supra note 2, at 371. 
23 See, e.g., Ford, supra note 2, at 374. 
24 U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
25 See Jaynes v. Commonwealth, 666 S.E.2d 303, 314 (Va. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
1670 (2009). 
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not limited strictly to commercial e-mail and instead forbade sending 
any unsolicited e-mail with fake or inaccurate delivery information.26 
The court concluded that because such prohibitions can undermine 
the ability to speak anonymously on the Internet, they are not narrowly 
tailored to address the interests the statute seeks to protect and are 
therefore unconstitutional.27 The U.S. Supreme Court has also invali-
dated regulations that single out commercial speech where the nature 
of the speech is unrelated to the legislative interests the regulation is 
trying to serve.28 Thus, the CAN-SPAM Act serves as the floor and the 
First Amendment serves as the ceiling in defining a narrow area where 
state regulation may be allowed.29 
 This Note will examine what makes spam regulation effective and 
suggest additional approaches to controlling spam.30 Part I will explain 
the underlying problem of unsolicited e-mail, catalog the costs associ-
ated with spam, and examine why purely technological attempts to 
combat spam have failed.31 Part II will survey the current state and fed-
eral approaches to combating spam, and discuss why these approaches 
have likewise not been completely successful.32 Specifically, it will ex-
plain both the recent interpretation of the preemption provision of the 
CAN-SPAM Act and the First Amendment concerns that arise in spam 
regulation.33 Part III will analyze how the preemption provision of the 
CAN-SPAM Act and the overbreadth doctrine constrain state action in 
the area of regulation.34 It will also reevaluate some fundamental as-
sumptions about spam and how these assumptions affect the efficacy of 
legislative solutions to the problem of spam.35 Part IV suggests how 
courts and legislatures, through flexibility and a realignment of incen-
                                                                                                                      
26 See id. at 305–06; see also Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–152.3:1(A)(1) (West 2009) (applying 
to “any person who (1) Uses [computer networks] with the intent to falsify or forge elec-
tronic mail transmission information . . . in connection with the transmission of unsolicited 
bulk electronic mail . . .”) (emphasis added). 
27 See Jaynes, 666 S.E.2d at 312–13; see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (“Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a per-
nicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Ano-
nymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”). 
28 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993). 
29 See 15 U.S.C §§ 7701–7713 (2006); Jaynes, 666 S.E.2d at 314. 
30 See infra notes 37–317 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 37–104 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 105–212 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 115–212 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 213–285 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 248–285 and accompanying text. 
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tives, can modify their approach to fighting spam to better address this 
seemingly unending problem.36 
I. The Spam Problem & Technological Attempts to Solve It 
 The widespread use of e-mail and the ease with which spam can be 
sent combine to create a uniquely challenging problem which imposes 
costs onto the recipients of spam.37 Although the problem stems in part 
from the technological nature of e-mail, so far it has been resistant to 
technological attempts to remedy it.38 
A. Fraud, Obscenity, and Cost: Why Spam Poses a Problem 
 Spam presents a problem for the recipient in both direct and indi-
rect ways.39 The most egregious direct effect of spam is often its fraudu-
lent content, which may include malicious attachments, viruses, links to 
fraudulent “phishing” websites to steal confidential financial informa-
tion, and sundry other scams.40 Additionally, spam serves as a frequent 
carrier of pornography and other obscene material.41 Because cur-
rently there is no way for spammers to determine the age of the e-mail 
recipients, minors may receive such objectionable material.42 
 Proponents of spam regulation also argue that spam harms con-
sumers indirectly by raising the cost of e-mail and shifting the advertis-
ers’ costs to the recipients.43 Unlike more traditional forms of advertis-
ing, the cost of sending spam is very low for the sender and is borne 
largely by its recipients, in the form of higher Internet charges, hard-
                                                                                                                      
36 See infra notes 286–317 and accompanying text. 
37 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Solving the Inbox Paradox: An Information-Based Policy Ap-
proach to Unsolicited E-mail Advertising, 10 Va. J. L. & Tech. 5, ¶¶ 8–14 (2005). 
38 See Lessig, supra note 1, at 261–62. 
39 See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3)–(6) (2006); see also S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 5–7 (2003), reprinted in 2004 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2351–53 (listing fraudulent schemes, privacy risks, and objectionable 
content that is transmitted in spam). 
40 See Dunham & Melnick, supra note 12, at 1–4; McNealy, supra note 6, at 275; Zuch-
off, supra note 7, at 36. 
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(5); S. Rep. No. 108–102, at 6 (“[T]he FTC estimates that 18 
percent of all spam is pornographic . . . .”). 
42 See Hamel, supra note 1, at 970. 
43 See S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 6 (citing a European Union study that found that spam 
costs Internet subscribers worldwide over nine billion dollars per year); Bambauer, supra 
note 37, ¶¶ 11–12, 11 n.61 (citing research conclusions that spam adds as much as two 
dollars per month in ISP fees); Soma et al., supra note 10, at 169. 
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ware and software expenses, and productivity costs.44 ISPs claim that 
spam congests their networks, slows down the Internet service for all 
users, and forces ISPs to invest in otherwise unnecessary infrastruc-
ture.45 Businesses, in addition to incurring the costs of network up-
grades and spam solutions, also suffer from lost productivity because 
their employees spend at least some part of the business day sorting 
through spam.46 Additionally, spam may disproportionately harm rural 
e-mail subscribers and business travelers, who pay per-minute connec-
tion charges to access their e-mail by dial-up modem.47 
 Lastly, there is an information cost of spam.48 As more and more 
legitimate messages get lost amid the unending deluge of spam, e-mail 
users will be forced to either waste time sifting through the spam or risk 
missing important messages.49 Ultimately, e-mail may become so flooded 
with spam that it will be rendered completely ineffective as a communi-
cation medium.50 
B. Why Spam Is Hard to Fight: Technology and Terminology 
 In order to understand why spam poses a special challenge to regu-
lators and legislators, it is useful to understand the currently existing e-
mail technology and the assumptions underlying it.51 A typical e-mail 
message consists of a header, body, and, occasionally, attachments.52 The 
header contains information such as the message sender’s address, the 
recipients’ addresses, and the subject of the message.53 The body con-
                                                                                                                      
44 See Steven Brody & Bruce E.H. Johnson, Advertising and Commercial Speech: 
A First Amendment Guide § 13:3.2(A) (2d ed. 2008) (estimating the cost to be as high as 
ten billion dollars per year); see also Bambauer, supra note 37, ¶¶ 11–12 (explaining associ-
ated costs). 
45 See S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 6. But see White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex., 
420 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that ISP inefficiency is “among the most 
chronically over-used and under-substantiated interests asserted by parties . . . involved in 
Internet litigation . . .”). 
46 See S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 7 (estimating cost to business from spam to be ten billion 
dollars in 2003). 
47 See id. (stating that for rural customers and business travelers, “spam is more than 
just a loss of time or productivity; it is actually an additional charge . . .”). 
48 See Bambauer, supra note 37, ¶¶ 3–4 (recasting spam as an information problem). 
49 See Hamel, supra note 1, at 969–70. 
50 See id.; see also S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 6 (“Left unchecked at its present rate of in-
crease, spam may soon undermine the usefulness and efficiency of e-mail as a communica-
tions tool.”). 
51 See Bambauer, supra note 37, ¶ 4. 
52 See David H. Crocker, Standard for the Format of APRA Internet Text Mes-
sages 4 (1982), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc822.txt. 
53 See id. 
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tains the main contents of the message.54 Because senders can specify 
multiple recipients, they are able to send e-mail to a large number of 
people very quickly and cost-effectively.55 Senders are typically not 
charged per message.56 
 Spammers are able to exploit the trust built into the e-mail proto-
cols.57 The sender’s return address is supposed to correspond to the 
host computer that sent the message.58 As the message travels from the 
sender to the recipient it goes through several e-mail servers, and in 
doing so, it builds up information about this transmission path, such as 
the numeric addresses of the servers it went through.59 Spammers, 
however, can forge or falsify both the return address and transmission 
path information to disguise the source of the message, and this false 
information contributes to the problem of spam and the difficulty in 
trying to stop it.60 
 Information on the Internet travels in discrete packets of data that 
are sent to the proper destination by pieces of hardware called routers.61 
Because the Internet was designed to be a decentralized network that 
could withstand the loss of any one router, the message can take several 
paths en route from the sender to the recipient.62 Very little authentica-
tion is built into the Internet e-mail protocols, and there is no central 
server or router that can verify the source or identity of any one mes-
sage.63 Although this design leads to a more robust network, it creates 
vulnerabilities that unscrupulous spammers can exploit.64 
C. Attempts to Stop Spam Through Software and Infrastructure 
 Not content to wait for the government to address the problem of 
unsolicited e-mail, the private sector has attempted to decrease the flow 
of spam with technological approaches.65 Several of these techniques 
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. 
55 See Bambauer, supra note 37, ¶ 11. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. ¶ 8. 
58 See Dickinson, supra note 11, at 133. 
59 See id. (discussing forwarding of electronic mail by server). 
60 See Bambauer, supra note 37, ¶ 9; Hamel, supra note 1, at 970. 
61 See Tanenbaum, supra note 2, at 62. 
62 See Dickinson, supra note 11, at 145. 
63 See Bambauer, supra note 37, ¶¶ 8–9. 
64 See id. ¶ 9. 
65 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 1, at 261–62. See generally Zdziarski, supra note 2 (survey-
ing technological approaches to fighting spam). 
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have been implemented and had varying degrees of impact on spam.66 
Additionally, the FTC evaluated several proposed techniques and con-
cluded that they would be ineffective in controlling the assault of unso-
licited e-mail.67 
1. Existing Techniques: Filters and Blacklists 
 ISPs use sophisticated filtering software to try to identify spam and 
either flag or remove it from users’ mailboxes.68 Additionally, private 
websites create and maintain blacklists—lists of known spammers and 
ISPs that allow spam to be sent from their servers—which other ISPs 
use to block offending e-mail messages.69 Although widely used, both 
these approaches suffer from several disadvantages that render them 
an incomplete solution to the problem of spam.70 
a. Filtering Spam with Software 
 To reduce the amount of unwanted spam in their users’ electronic 
mailboxes, ISPs often use software filters to catch offending messages.71 
These filters use a variety of approaches to try to classify incoming e-
mail into two groups: spam and non-spam.72 Initially relying on simple 
text matching, these filters have become much more sophisticated, us-
ing statistical and probabilistic algorithms to catch even the most clever 
spammer.73 Filters can be used by both the ISP and the e-mail recipient, 
allowing individual users to change personal settings and make the fil-
tering more effective.74 
 As these filters have improved, spammers have become more crea-
tive, altering both the subject line and the contents of the messages to 
make spam seem innocuous, thereby evading the filters.75 Because most 
filtering algorithms are based on a probabilistic approach, there are 
necessarily false positives (non-spam that is flagged as spam) and false 
                                                                                                                      
66 See Zdziarski, supra note 2, at 26–38 (describing filtering, blacklisting, whitelisting, 
and other techniques). 
67 See infra note 87. 
68 See S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 6 (2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2352. 
69 See Lessig, supra note 1, at 263. 
70 See id. at 263–64. 
71 See Hamel, supra note 1, at 973. 
72 See Zdziarski, supra note 2, at 45. 
73 See id. at 49, 63–64. 
74 See id. at 26. 
75 See Lessig, supra note 1, at 263 (explaining the arms race between filter creators and 
spammers, who use those filters to ensure their messages can defeat such filters, spurring 
further filter development). 
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negatives (spam that is not flagged) created.76 Because false positives 
result in legitimate messages potentially being deleted or lost, filters are 
usually set to be more lenient and disfavor flagging non-spam as spam.77 
Such settings result in looser algorithms that allow more false negatives, 
inundating users’ e-mail boxes with unwanted solicitations.78 
b. Blacklisting Known Spammers 
 Blacklists represent another weapon in the war on spam.79 Once a 
spammer’s e-mail or computer address ends up on one of these lists, all 
e-mail messages from that spammer can be filtered and deleted.80 Like-
wise, ISPs that allow anonymous or unauthenticated e-mailing, known as 
“open relays,” can also be blocked by adding them to the blacklist.81 
This technology has the dual benefit of excluding the open relays that 
send spam and forcing ISPs that do not want to be blacklisted to modify 
their server settings so as to close the open relays that spammers ex-
ploit.82 
 Unfortunately, blacklists are susceptible to the same overinclusive 
problems as filters.83 By blocking any e-mail correspondence from ISPs 
which may have some spam, blacklists often block legitimate, solicited e-
mail that happens to come from the same server.84 Once an e-mail ad-
dress ends up on such a blacklist, it can be difficult and time-consuming 
to have it removed, even if the address was added by mistake or is no 
longer a spam-friendly open relay.85 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Paul Graham, Better Bayesian Spam Filtering ( Jan. 2003) (unpublished manu-
script, available at http://www.paulgraham.com/better.html); see also Zdziarski, supra note 2, 
at 46 (describing Bayesian filtering); Mehran Sahami et al., A Bayesian Approach to Filtering 
Junk E-mail (1998) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://robotics.stanford.edu/users/ 
sahami/papers-dir/spam.pdf). 
77 See Hamel, supra note 1, at 973–74. Hamel describes an extreme case where e-mail 
messages containing the word “specialist” were being flagged as spam because the word 
contained within it the word “cialis,” a common subject of spam. Id. 
78 See id. 
79 See Lessig, supra note 1, at 263; Zdziarski, supra note 2, at 27. 
80 See Zdziarski, supra note 2, at 27. 
81 See id. at 28. 
82 See id.; see also Lessig, supra note 1, at 263. 
83 See Zdziarski, supra note 2, at 28–29. 
84 See id. 
85 See id.; see also Lessig, supra note 1, at 263. 
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2. Other Technology-Based Approaches Rejected by the FTC 
 The FTC, as mandated by the CAN-SPAM Act,86 has also investi-
gated several proposed ways to combat spam and has reported to Con-
gress on their viability.87 These proposals centered on using govern-
mental regulatory agencies—such as the FTC—in cooperation with e-
mail users to reduce spam.88 Some proposals were modeled after suc-
cessful regulation of other communications media.89 Due to the under-
lying architectural limitations of e-mail, however, the FTC found these 
proposals would be ineffective at best, and at worst could even exacer-
bate the problem of spam.90 
a. A Bounty System to Catch Spammers 
 Professor Lawrence Lessig proposed using a well-regulated bounty 
system, in conjunction with laws requiring accurate labeling of e-mail, 
to address the problem of spam.91 If e-mail messages were properly la-
beled, they could easily be sorted and filtered by software, without the 
kind of arms race and deception currently created by filtering.92 In or-
der to enforce such labeling, Lessig proposed creating private bounty 
hunters who would be “deputized” by the FTC to identify and report 
mislabeled e-mail.93 Lessig argued that this system would change incen-
tives for spammers, exposing them (or the entities that use spam to ad-
vertise their products) to such liability that would make spam more 
costly, and therefore less viable.94 
                                                                                                                      
86 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7709, 7710 (2006). 
87 See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n, A CAN-SPAM Informant Reward System: A Re-
port to Congress (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/rewardsys/040916reward 
sysrpt.pdf [hereinafter Informant Reward System Report]; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Na-
tional Do Not Email Registry: A Report to Congress (2004), available at http://www. 
ftc.gov/reports/dneregistry/report.pdf [hereinafter Do Not Email Registry Report]; Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Subject Line Labeling As a Weapon Against Spam: A CAN-SPAM Act 
Report to Congress (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/canspam05/050616 
canspamrpt.pdf [hereinafter Subject Line Labeling Report]. 
88 See Informant Reward System Report, supra note 87, at 1–5; Do Not Email Regis-
try Report, supra note 87, at i–ii; Subject Line Labeling Report, supra note 87, at i–ii. 
89 See Do Not Email Registry Report, supra note 87, at 14 (proposing a model based 
on the success of the Do Not Call Registry). 
90 See id. at 15–16 (“A National Do Not Email Registry containing individual e-mail ad-
dresses would suffer from a significant security weakness that would enable spammers to 
treat the Registry as the National Do Spam Registry, causing more spam . . . .”). 
91 See Lessig, supra note 1, at 266. 
92 See id. at 264. 
93 See id. at 266. 
94 See id. at 267. 
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 The FTC evaluated such a bounty system and found that it was 
unlikely to be effective for several reasons.95 First, spammers use various 
methods to conceal their identities and the sources of their e-mail mes-
sages, making tracking and identifying them more difficult.96 Second, 
proving individual spammer liability requires proving elements such as 
a requisite level of knowledge, a task complicated by the fact that 
spammers typically distance themselves from illegal activity through 
decentralized networks.97 Furthermore, the individuals likely to have 
high-value information are those who are closely involved with the 
spammers themselves, such as “insiders” and “whistleblowers.”98 A suc-
cessful bounty system would aim to encourage these “high-value” indi-
viduals to provide information while minimizing “low-value” informa-
tion from ordinary spam recipients.99 Designing an incentive system 
that differentiates between these two types of information is not easy.100 
b. National Do Not Spam Registry 
 The FTC, per the CAN-SPAM Act’s command, also investigated the 
feasibility of setting up a National Do Not Email Registry, akin to the 
National Do Not Call Registry.101 The FTC found that such a registry 
would be ineffective due to inherent weaknesses in the e-mail proto-
cols, namely lack of authentication and the ability to disguise one’s 
identity.102 Worse, until such an authentication standard is developed 
and implemented, the Do Not Email Registry would turn into a Do 
Email Registry, allowing spammers to harvest valid e-mail addresses of 
individuals.103 The FTC recommended a series of steps that would help 
it establish a Do Not Email Registry, such as mandating an authentica-
                                                                                                                      
95 See Informant Reward System Report, supra note 87, at 28 (noting that the costs 
of a reward system may outweigh the benefits from it). 
96 See id. at 11. 
97 See id. at 16. 
98 See id. at 26. 
99 See id. at 23. 
100 See id. at 37. 
101 See 15 U.S.C. § 7708(a) (2006). The National Do Not Call Registry was set up by the 
Federal Communications Commission, pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act of 1991. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit up-
held the constitutionality of the Registry, finding that it was narrowly tailored because it 
only restricted speech aimed at unwilling recipients. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. 
FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1242 (10th Cir. 2004). 
102 See Do Not Email Registry Report, supra note 87, at 8, 34. 
103 See id. at 15–16, 17 (calling any such registry a “Fort Knox” list for the criminal 
spammer). 
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tion standard, but it is unlikely that these recommendations will be im-
plemented in the near future.104 
II. Legislative Efforts to Reduce Spam 
 The failure of technological solutions alone to check the exponen-
tial increase in spam and the rejection of governmental regulatory so-
lutions as ineffective have led to an increased interest in addressing the 
spam problem at a legislative and judicial level.105 Both the states and 
Congress have responded to the call to reduce spam, and both have 
been less than successful.106 
A. State Legislation to Reduce Spam 
 Nevada became the first state to pass laws regulating and prohibit-
ing the sending of unsolicited commercial electronic mail in 1997, and 
an increasing number of states followed suit shortly thereafter.107 By 
2004, when the federal CAN-SPAM Act went into effect, thirty-six states 
had some type of anti-spam law.108 
 States varied in their approaches to regulating spam.109 Some states 
passed strict opt-in laws, requiring the user to essentially subscribe to 
receiving unsolicited e-mail; whereas others mandated clear labeling in 
the subject lines to make filtering more accurate; still others relied on 
opt-out provisions.110 Some states created a cause of action for an indi-
vidual to sue a spammer under the state statute or regulation.111 
 It remains unclear why these state laws were ineffective in reducing 
the volume of spam.112 Some courts have suggested that disparate state 
laws made compliance impractical because of the nature of e-mail it-
self.113 Other scholars have argued that stronger state laws would have 
                                                                                                                      
104 See id. at 36–37. 
105 See Lessig, supra note 1, at 262–63. 
106 See, e.g., Zdziarski, supra note 2, at 23 (noting that the CAN-SPAM Act has not had 
a significant effect on spam); Ford, supra note 2, at 356. 
107 See Hamel, supra note 1, at 976. 
108 See id.; see also David E. Sorkin, Summary of Spam Laws, http://spamlaws.com/ 
state/summary.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2009) (containing a comprehensive list of state 
spam laws). 
109 See Hamel, supra note 1, at 976–79. 
110 See id. at 976–78. 
111 See Cain, supra note 13, at 773 (noting that most state anti-spam laws provide attor-
ney’s fees in addition to providing private causes of action). 
112 See 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(11) (2006). 
113 See Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 
2006). A sender cannot determine the geographic location of the recipient from their e-
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been more effective had they not been preempted by the passage of the 
comprehensive federal law.114 
B. The Federal CAN-SPAM Act and Its Preemption of State Law 
 Recognizing the need for uniform regulation, Congress enacted 
the CAN-SPAM Act in 2003, which President George W. Bush signed 
into law.115 The Act contains several provisions to deal with the on-
slaught of unsolicited commercial e-mail, such as prohibiting messages 
with materially false or misleading header information,116 prohibiting 
misleading subject lines,117 and providing recipients with the ability to 
opt out of receiving such messages.118 Although some of these provi-
sions are similar to their state-law counterparts, they are generally con-
sidered to be weaker.119 
 The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution gives Congress the 
power to preempt state law in a particular field of regulation.120 The 
CAN-SPAM Act contains an express preemption clause, whereby it “su-
persedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivi-
sion of a State that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send 
commercial messages, except to the extent that any such statute, regu-
lation or rule prohibits falsity or deception in any portion of a com-
mercial electronic mail message.”121 This type of preemption, embod-
ied in the first clause of the provision, is the clearest expression of 
                                                                                                                      
mail address, and therefore a sender must either comply with the strictest state law in any 
state, or risk inadvertently violating the law. See id. at 355, 356. 
114 See Hamel, supra note 1, at 978–79. Some commentators have suggested that fear of 
strong state legislation, such as “opt-in” provisions, may have been an impetus for the CAN-
SPAM Act, and that several marketing industry groups lobbied Congress to pass a weaker 
national bill. See, e.g., Stefanie Olsen, Ad Groups Lobby for Antispam Law, Cnet News, Nov. 
13, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/Ad-groups-lobby-for-antispam-law/2100–1024_3–5107059. 
html; Andrea Stone, Marketers Trying to Influence Congress on Spam, USA Today, Nov. 10, 
2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003–11–10-spam-congress_x.htm (“[Lob-
byists fear] a tough anti-spam law will destroy the Internet as a burgeoning marketplace 
. . . .”). Additionally, such strong laws may not survive a constitutional challenge. See 
Hamel, supra note 1, at 979. 
115 See 15 U.S.C §§ 7701–7713. 
116 Id. § 7704(a)(1). 
117 Id. § 7704(a)(2). 
118 Id. § 7704(a)(5). 
119 See Soma et al., supra note 10, at 165–66. For instance, the CAN-SPAM Act does not 
create a cause of action for an individual aggrieved by receiving unsolicited e-mail, instead 
giving a cause of action only to certain federal agencies, states, and ISPs. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7706; see also Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 357 n.3. 
120 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
121 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1). 
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congressional intent to supersede state law, but still requires judicial 
interpretation as to both the scope and the effect of preemption.122 
1. Exemption of Some State Laws from the CAN-SPAM Act 
 While this provision of the Act appears to expressly preempt any 
prior state regulation of spam, there are three important qualifica-
tions.123 First, only state regulation of commercial e-mail is preempted.124 
This limitation suggests that state regulation of electronic mail that is not 
strictly commercial may survive preemption.125 Second, the CAN-SPAM 
Act preserves state statutes and regulations if they deal with falsity or de-
ception in e-mail messages.126 This exemption, embodied in the second 
clause of the provision, may leave substantial state law in place, depend-
ing on how broadly the scope of the exemption is interpreted.127 Lastly, 
because the Act exempts ISPs, Congress may have intended to allow state 
entities operating as ISPs to regulate spam as they see fit.128 
 Courts have differed over the interpretation of the exemption, and 
subsequently, over which law—state or federal—governs the cause of 
action.129 Such decisions have significant implications for spam regula-
tion because state and federal laws vary widely with respect to elements 
like standing and available remedies.130 Thus, the applicability vel non of 
                                                                                                                      
122 See Ford, supra note 2, at 366–67. 
123 See 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b),(c). 
124 See 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (“This chapter supersedes any statute, regulation, or 
rule of a State or political subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use of elec-
tronic mail to send commercial messages . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
125 See Jaynes v. Commonwealth, 666 S.E.2d 303, 313 (Va. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
1670 (2009). Broad regulation of electronic mail by the states, however, may nonetheless 
encounter other challenges. See infra notes 171–212 and accompanying text. 
126 See 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (stating that the CAN-SPAM Act preempts state statutes 
“except to the extent that any such statute . . . prohibits falsity or deception in any portion of 
[an e-mail] message”) (emphasis added). 
127 Compare Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 348 (holding that the CAN-SPAM Act preempts 
state law), with Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523 (D. Md. 2006) (up-
holding state law because it compliments the purposes of the CAN-SPAM Act). 
128 See White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex., 420 F.3d 366, 369 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that a state university that provides e-mail to its students was exempt from the 
CAN-SPAM Act under that provision). Congress may not have anticipated this effect when 
drafting the Act. See id. at 373–74. 
129 See Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 356; Beyond Sys., 422 F. Supp. 2d at 538. 
130 See 15 U.S.C. § 7706; Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 356. For example, individuals do 
not have standing under the CAN-SPAM Act to bring suits against spammers, but may have 
such standing under state laws. See Beyond Sys., 422 F. Supp. 2d at 538. 
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state laws turns on how broadly courts interpret the phrase, “falsity or 
deception in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message.”131 
a. Beyond Systems, Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc.: A Broad Reading of Exemption 
 In 2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland took 
a broad reading of the exemption provision in Beyond Systems, Inc. v. 
Keynetics, Inc., when it held that the Maryland Commercial Electronic 
Mail Act (“MCEMA”) was not inconsistent with the CAN-SPAM Act.132 
MCEMA, like the CAN-SPAM Act, prohibits the use of false or mislead-
ing information about the origin or the transmission path of commer-
cial e-mail messages, as well as messages which contain false or mislead-
ing subject lines.133 The plaintiff, Beyond Systems, Inc. (“BSI”) alleged 
that it received over 6000 e-mail messages from the defendants, all of 
which were false and misleading with regard to either their origin, 
transmission path, or subject line information.134 BSI also alleged that 
the defendant spammers conspired to send such unsolicited bulk e-
mail in violation of the MCEMA.135 
 The court, relying in part on other state law decisions, held that 
because the MCEMA regulated falsity and deception in the e-mail mes-
sage and did not frustrate the goals of the federal legislation, it fit un-
der the exemption to the CAN-SPAM Act.136 Furthermore, because the 
statute made it illegal to conspire, to initiate, or to assist in the trans-
mission of unsolicited e-mail, the court allowed the action to proceed, 
as there was no equivalent to the conspiracy or assistance element un-
der the federal Act.137 The court found that the civil remedies provided 
                                                                                                                      
131 See 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1); Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 356; Beyond Sys., 422 F. 
Supp. 2d at 538. 
132 See 422 F. Supp. 2d at 538. 
133 Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-3002(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); see generally 
MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 890 A.2d 818 (Md. App. 2006) (interpreting 
MCEMA). 
134 See Beyond Sys., 422 F. Supp. 2d at 528. BSI was described by the court as an ISP, and 
therefore would have standing under the CAN-SPAM Act without the need to resort to 
state statutes. See id. The district court, however, read the MCEMA to provide a civil remedy 
to individuals who are not ISPs as well. See id. at 535. 
135 See id. at 528. 
136 See id. at 535, 538 (“[I]t is readily apparent that MCEMA . . . is in no way inconsistent 
with CAN-SPAM. At most it supplements the federal law. . . . [T]he preemption doctrine 
simply does not apply.”). The court found that the plaintiff had pled the elements of falsity 
with sufficient particularity to fall under the state law provision. See id. at 541–42. 
137 See id. at 538. 
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by the state were “fully in harmony with CAN-SPAM’s enforcement 
mechanisms.”138 
 Such a broad interpretation of the “falsity or deception” element 
of the exemption provision may be problematic.139 At best, it supple-
ments the CAN-SPAM Act with the full array of state legislation aimed 
to protect the recipients.140 At worst, such an overinclusive interpreta-
tion completely eviscerates the Act, rendering it irrelevant.141 
b. Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc.: A Narrow Reading 
 In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit took a 
narrow view of the exemption provision in the CAN-SPAM Act in Omega 
World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc. in 2006.142 Mummagraphics was 
an Oklahoma corporation that received unsolicited e-mail messages 
advertising vacation packages.143 The headers in these messages were 
alleged to have false and misleading information, but the body of the 
message contained an electronic opt-out link, as well as a mailing ad-
dress to which the recipient could write to ask to be removed from the 
electronic mailing list.144 Mummagraphics, in bringing suit under both 
the CAN-SPAM Act and an Oklahoma statute governing false and mis-
leading electronic mail, argued that state law was not preempted be-
cause the CAN-SPAM Act allows states to prohibit falsity and decep-
tion.145 
 In its analysis of whether the Oklahoma law was preempted by the 
CAN-SPAM Act, the Fourth Circuit looked to Congress’s purpose in 
enacting the Act.146 The court found that although these were indeed 
inaccuracies in the message, they did not make the message “materially 
false or materially misleading.”147 Reasoning that Congress’ enactment 
of the CAN-SPAM Act was not intended to create a strict liability stan-
                                                                                                                      
138 See id. 
139 See id. at 535 (“Getting the State Attorney General to undertake an action [under 
CAN-SPAM] against . . . out-of-state spammers is much easier said than done.”); cf. Donald 
G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens Patriae Product 
Litigation, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 913, 919 (2008) (questioning whether “our constitutional 
framework vests [enforcement] power in state attorneys general”). 
140 See Beyond Sys., 422 F. Supp. 2d at 535–36. 
141 See Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 355–56. 
142 See id. at 354. 
143 See id. at 350–51. 
144 See id. at 351. 
145 See id. at 350, 353. Because Mummagraphics was considered an ISP, it was able to 
bring suit under the CAN-SPAM Act. See id. at 357 n.3. 
146 See id. at 355. 
147 Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 354. 
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dard for errors, the court held that allowing the Oklahoma law to coex-
ist with the CAN-SPAM Act would have precisely that effect.148 The ex-
pansive multi-state nature of spam makes it likely that those wanting to 
comply with spam regulations would have to comply with the strictest 
provisions, thereby imposing this standard onto all other states.149 Be-
cause the message bodies contained information on how to identify 
and contact the sender, the court held that the alleged inaccuracies 
could not have impaired any party from raising a CAN-SPAM claim to 
find the offending company and presumably opt out of further mail-
ings.150 Therefore, the plain intent of Congress in passing the CAN-
SPAM Act was to preempt the Oklahoma law and consequently an ac-
tion under such law could not be maintained.151 
 Because the CAN-SPAM Act does not create a private cause of ac-
tion, such a narrow reading of the “false or misleading” element effec-
tively prevents individuals from suing under their state laws except 
where such falsity rises to the level of being “material.”152 As a result, 
the Fourth Circuit’s Mummagraphics decision has been criticized as frus-
trating consumers’ self-help measures and favoring spammers over 
spam recipients.153 But, because Congress was aware of private rights of 
action and purposely chose to exclude them from the CAN-SPAM Act, 
the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the preemption clause is arguably 
more in agreement with congressional intent.154 
2. Unanticipated Consequences of the CAN-SPAM Act 
 The exemption provision of the Act, for better or worse, creates an 
unforeseen possibility for state or municipal regulation of spam.155 Be-
                                                                                                                      
148 See id. 
149 See id. at 356. 
150 See id. at 358. 
151 See id. at 355. The court further found that errors in the spam were not actionable 
under the CAN-SPAM Act because they were not substantial enough to make the headings 
“materially false or materially misleading.” See id. at 357. 
152 See id. at 359 (“The CAN-SPAM Act . . . does not make every error or opt-out re-
quest into grounds for a lawsuit.”); cf. Michael K. Avery, Whose Rights? Why States Should Set 
the Parameters for Federal Honest Services Mail and Wire Fraud Prosecutions, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 
1431, 1442 (2008) (describing circuit court precedent where violation of underlying state 
law was used as a basis for federal wire and mail fraud prosecution). 
153 See Katherine Wong, The Future of Spam Litigation After Omega World Travel v. 
Mummagraphics, 20 Harv. J. L. & Tech 459, 476–77 (2007). 
154 See Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 355–56. 
155 See Bailey, supra note 13, at 611. 
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cause the Act does not affect the policies of ISPs,156 a state acting as an 
ISP, not a regulator, would be allowed to implement technological poli-
cies that are not specified by the CAN-SPAM Act.157 This may allow a 
state actor to continue experimenting with different approaches to 
fighting spam, such as requiring subject-line labeling, rejecting e-mail 
from blacklisted senders, and more drastic measures, like blocking all 
unsolicited e-mail—effectively requiring users to opt-in to receive mes-
sages from particular senders.158 
 This approach is seen in White Buffalo Ventures, LCC v. University of 
Texas, where, in 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
held that the University of Texas fell within the ISP exemption because 
it provided e-mail accounts and e-mail access to students and faculty.159 
In that case, White Buffalo, an online dating site targeting college stu-
dents, sent several e-mail blasts to the University of Texas community, 
prompting complaints.160 Although the e-mails complied with the CAN-
SPAM Act, the University nonetheless decided to block further incom-
ing e-mail originating from the specific addresses used by White Buf-
falo.161 White Buffalo argued that because its spam was not fraudulent 
and complied with the requirements of the CAN-SPAM Act, that the 
University—a “political subdivision” of the state for CAN-SPAM pur-
poses—could not create rules that authorized the use of filters to block 
the spam.162 
 The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to apply preemption where the 
University of Texas was both an ISP and a state actor, concluding that 
the ambiguity in the CAN-SPAM Act exempted state-run ISPs from its 
purview and allowed them to implement filtering rules.163 By expressly 
preempting state regulation while at the same time expressly exempt-
ing Internet providers from preemption, Congress failed to take into 
                                                                                                                      
156 See 15 U.S.C. § 7707(c) (2006) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to have 
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forcement by a provider of Internet access service of a policy of declining to transmit, route, 
relay, handle, or store certain types of electronic mail messages.”) (emphasis added). 
157 See White Buffalo, 420 F.3d at 373. 
158 See Jason A. Smith, Comment, Spam (Supremacy Clause, Public Forums, and Mailings): 
The Fifth Circuit’s Interpretation of the CAN-SPAM Act in White Buffalo v. University of Texas, 
38 St. Mary’s L.J. 553, 588 (2007). 
159 See White Buffalo, 420 F.3d at 373. 
160 See id. at 369. 
161 See id. at 369 & n.5. 
162 See id. at 371. 
163 See id. at 372–73. 
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account situations where those two entities are one and the same.164 
The court was therefore unwilling to overrule the typically strong “pre-
sumption against preemption of state law” where the plain language of 
the statute created such ambiguity.165 
 This interpretation leaves open the possibility that states and their 
subdivisions who want to regulate spam may do so by becoming ISPs.166 
Many cities and municipalities planning to provide Internet access to 
their residents may find such an approach attractive.167 This solution 
has been criticized, however, as frustrating congressional intent in pass-
ing the CAN-SPAM Act.168 Other commentators suggest that states 
should not compete with private e-mail providers—thereby angering a 
potential ally in the fight against spam—and should instead encourage 
private advancement in technology.169 Such criticisms are somewhat 
circular because neither the CAN-SPAM Act nor private efforts to stem 
the tide of spam have been successful.170 
C. Constitutional Concerns 
 Regulation of spam, and of e-mail in general, may raise constitu-
tional concerns because the First Amendment prohibits federal and state 
governments from making laws abridging the freedom of speech.171 The 
U.S. Supreme Court, however, has recognized that the government’s in-
terest in regulating some commercial speech may outweigh First 
Amendment concerns and commercial speech may be entitled to fewer 
protections.172 This speech is afforded less protection because it typically 
occurs in the context of commercial transactions, which are traditionally 
subject to more government regulation and more prone to fraud.173 
                                                                                                                      
164 See id. The court “doubt[ed] that . . . legislators responsible for passing the [Act’s 
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165 See White Buffalo, 420 F.3d at 370 & n.9, 373–74. 
166 See Bailey, supra note 13, at 610–12. 
167 See id. at 611; see also Julia DiPasquale, Comment, Currents: Cities Providing Wi-fi to Resi-
dents—Broadband Socialism or Wireless Freedom, Univ. of Pitt. J. of Tech L. & Pol’y, Feb. 16, 
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168 See Smith, supra note 158, at 573–74. 
169 See Bailey, supra note 13, at 644. 
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171 U.S. Const. amend. I; see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (applying First 
Amendment protections to the states). 
172 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1983). 
173 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980). 
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1. The Central Hudson Test: Regulation of Commercial Speech 
 Because commercial speech is based on a more economic—rather 
than expressive—interest, commercial speech that deceives the public 
may be banned or restricted.174 Thus, the government may regulate 
false, deceptive, or misleading commercial speech without running 
afoul of the First Amendment, and may likewise prohibit commercial 
speech related to illegal behavior.175 
 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 
the U.S. Supreme Court first articulated a four-part test to determine 
whether commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment: 1) 
whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; 2) 
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial; 3) whether 
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; 
and 4) whether there is a “reasonable fit” between the regulation and 
the interest it aims to serve.176 The burden falls on the party seeking to 
restrict commercial speech to justify such a restriction.177 
2. Applying the Central Hudson Test to Spam Regulation 
 Spam that is fraudulent, misleading, or unlawful falls outside the 
scope of the First Amendment and may therefore be prohibited.178 
Regulation of non-fraudulent or lawful spam must meet the other three 
requirements of the Central Hudson test.179 To meet the second element 
of the test, the party seeking to regulate spam must show a government 
interest in restricting commercial speech.180 In the case of spam regula-
tion, the government interest usually centers on the direct and indirect 
costs to e-mail users.181 Government regulations that directly advance 
this specific interest satisfy the third element of the Central Hudson 
                                                                                                                      
174 See id. at 563. 
175 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69. 
176 See Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476, 480 (1989) (modifying the fourth prong of 
the Central Hudson test); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
177 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71 n.20 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570). 
178 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63 (“The First Amendment’s concern for com-
mercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising. Consequently, there 
can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not 
accurately inform the public about lawful activity.”) (internal citation omitted). 
179 See White Buffalo, 420 F.3d at 374 (proceeding with the Central Hudson test because 
White Buffalo’s spam was legal and contained factually accurate information). 
180 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (2006). 
181 See supra notes 39–50 and accompanying text. In White Buffalo, the University put 
forth two main arguments, that of “user efficiency” and “server efficiency,” which roughly 
correspond to the direct and indirect costs of spam. See 420 F.3d at 374–75. 
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test.182 It is generally easy to show that regulation of spam directly ad-
vances the interest of lowering costs imposed on e-mail users by 
spam.183 Lastly, there must be a reasonable fit between the legislation’s 
goal of reducing spam and the means chosen to achieve that goal.184 
Although this issue has not yet come up in the context of spam, dictum 
in the White Buffalo decision suggests that too much singling out of 
commercial speech may run into constitutional limitations.185 
 Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutional-
ity of the CAN-SPAM Act, it has been upheld by several lower courts.186 
According to these courts, several factors contribute to its constitution-
ality.187 First, because Congress may freely regulate or prohibit false or 
fraudulent spam, provisions of the CAN-SPAM Act prohibiting false or 
misleading transmission information and deceptive subject headings 
will surely survive constitutional scrutiny.188 Second, the Act is limited to 
commercial spam, an area that Congress has a significant interest in 
regulating, due to spam’s enormous economic impact.189 Third, such 
regulation aims to promote this interest by reducing the costs of 
spam.190 Lastly, because the CAN-SPAM Act does not prohibit, but 
merely seeks to regulate, the transmission of spam, it is likely to satisfy 
                                                                                                                      
182 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
183 See Vivek Arora, The CAN-SPAM Act: An Inadequate Attempt to Deal with a Growing Prob-
lem, 39 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 299, 305 (2006); see also White Buffalo, 420 F.3d at 375. 
184 See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480. 
185 See White Buffalo, 420 F.3d at 376 (“We reject, however, the proposition that the 
[spam-blocking] policy is no more extensive than necessary to secure the state’s . . . sub-
stantial interest, which is the efficiency of its servers.”). The court indicated that such a 
policy, which blocked all of White Buffalo’s spam, may not be a reasonable fit to the Uni-
versity’s stated goals of promoting server efficiency because other alternatives, such as 
restricting commercial spam to off-peak hours, may be less restrictive and more constitu-
tionally acceptable. See id. at 377. Such reasoning may pose challenges to state regulation 
of spam as the Supreme Court has also struck down commercial speech regulation when it 
seems unrelated to the interest asserted by the state. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993) (holding that, despite the nuisance factor posed 
by news racks on streets, the city could not make commercial publications bear the entire 
brunt of the regulation, because news racks created safety and aesthetic blights regardless 
of their content, and the notion that commercial speech is per se less important could not 
justify such a restriction). 
186 See, e.g., Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 359; White Buffalo, 420 F.3d at 378. 
187 See White Buffalo, 420 F.3d at 374–78. 
188 See 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1), (2) (2006); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63. 
189 See 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3)–(5); S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 3–7 (2003), reprinted in 2004 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2349–54 (detailing Congressional findings of fact about the cost of 
spam to consumers, businesses, and ISPs). 
190 See S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 7–8 (explaining how the CAN-SPAM Act tries to address 
the problem of spam). 
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the “reasonable fit” requirement because it is less restrictive than a total 
ban on spam.191 
3. Overbreadth, Anonymity, and the Limits of Speech 
 Because spam necessarily implicates speech concerns, additional 
First Amendment limitations—apart from commercial speech doc-
trines—may affect the constitutionality of spam regulation.192 Specifi-
cally the overbreadth doctrine, which allows courts to facially invalidate 
a statute even though it would be valid as it applied to a particular de-
fendant, may serve to invalidate spam regulation.193 
a. The Overbreadth Doctrine, Spam, and Commercial Speech 
 The overbreadth doctrine is needed in the First Amendment con-
text because the threat of enforcement of an unconstitutional statute 
may “chill” otherwise protected speech.194 This doctrine, however, is 
considered “strong medicine” because it creates an exception to the 
general rule that a person may not challenge a statute that is constitu-
tional when applied to them merely because it is unconstitutional when 
applied to others.195 The potentially vast reach of the overbreadth doc-
trine is limited in three significant ways.196 First, the overbreadth must 
be substantial when judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate 
sweep, and the doctrine’s reach attenuates as the behavior in question 
moves from “pure speech” into conduct which falls within otherwise 
valid criminal laws.197 Second, the doctrine does not typically apply to 
commercial speech, least of all to commercial speech that proposes an 
unlawful or fraudulent transaction.198 Third, the statute in question can 
                                                                                                                      
191 Compare Jaynes, 666 S.E.2d at 313 (prohibiting complete ban of unsolicited e-mail), 
with Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 359 (allowing regulation of commercial e-mail). 
192 See Jaynes, 666 S.E.2d at 313, 314. 
193 See id. at 314; see also United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1838 (2008). 
194 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
195 See Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1838 (“[I]nvalidating a law that in some of its applications 
is perfectly constitutional—particularly a law directed at conduct so antisocial that it has 
been made criminal—has obvious harmful effects.”). 
196 See id. 
197 See id.; Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. 
198 See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977) (“[T]he justification for the 
application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial 
context.”). Commercial speech is thought to be hardy enough to withstand overly broad 
statutes because of the “economic self-interest” of the speaker to continue speaking. See 
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6. 
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often be saved through a narrowing construction to avoid the over-
broad effect on speech.199 
 Thus, statutes that aim to not just regulate, but to effectively elimi-
nate, broad categories of spam may run afoul of the overbreadth doc-
trine.200 The state of Virginia took such a broad approach in attempting 
to control spam: it criminalized the sending of unsolicited bulk elec-
tronic mail with falsified or forged transmission information.201 Unlike 
Congress and other states, Virginia chose not to limit its statute strictly 
to commercial spam, applying it instead to all unsolicited bulk e-mail.202 
Thus speech that is non-commercial in nature could have subjected its 
sender to criminal penalties if it was sent to recipients in Virginia and con-
tained false header information obscuring the identity of the sender.203 
b. Jaynes v. Commonwealth: The Limit of Spam Regulation 
 Jeremy Jaynes, a notorious spammer from North Carolina,204 was 
prosecuted and convicted under the Virginia statute for sending over 
10,000 e-mail messages to users of America Online.205 On appeal, 
Jaynes raised the claim that the Virginia statute was unconstitutionally 
overbroad because it impermissibly restricted anonymous speech.206 
After a rehearing in 2008, the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed, and 
in Jaynes v. Commonwealth struck down the statute because it prohibited 
                                                                                                                      
199 See Williams, 128 S. Ct. at 1846. 
200 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17529.2 (West 2008) (requiring users to opt-in 
to receiving spam); Hamel, supra note 1, at 979 (suggesting this requirement would face 
constitutional challenge). 
201 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–152.3:1 (West 2008) (prohibiting all unsolicited e-mail with 
falsified transmission information, regardless of its commercial nature). Virginia is home 
to AOL, a large and heavily spammed ISP. See Zachary A. Goldfarb & Sam Diaz, AOL Mov-
ing Executives, Headquarters to New York, Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 2007, at A1. 
202 See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–152.3:1(A)(1) (applying to “any person who (1) Uses 
[computer networks] with the intent to falsify or forge electronic mail transmission infor-
mation . . . in connection with the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail . . .”) (em-
phasis added). 
203 See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–152.3:1(B) (defining felony offenses under the statute). 
204 See Candace Rondeaux, Anti-Spam Conviction Is Upheld, Wash. Post, Sep. 6, 2006, at 
B3. 
205 See Jaynes, 666 S.E.2d at 305. Jaynes tried to conceal his identity by falsifying the 
header information in the e-mails, but was nonetheless discovered through the use of a 
sophisticated investigative database. Id. at 305 & n.4. He was eventually sentenced to a total 
of nine years in prison. Id. at 306. His conviction was initially affirmed, but after his peti-
tion for rehearing was granted, the court reversed the conviction and held the Virginia 
statute to be unconstitutional. Id. at 303 n.1. 
206 See id. at 308. 
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the anonymous transmission of all unsolicited bulk e-mail.207 The court 
found that the statute would thus ban e-mail messages containing po-
litical, religious, or other types of speech protected by the First Amend-
ment.208 
 The Jaynes court did not dispute that the statute was enacted to 
control predominantly unsolicited commercial e-mail.209 The court con-
cluded that the statute was substantially overbroad on its face because it 
could impermissibly restrict core protected speech, such as political or 
religious speech.210 Specifically, the statute would ban anonymous non-
commercial speech and in this regard it was unconstitutional.211 Fur-
thermore, no reasonable interpretation would narrow the statute 
enough to save its constitutionality and the court refused to encroach 
on the province of the legislature by essentially rewriting it.212 
III. An Analysis of the Existing Framework for Spam Regulation 
& a Reevaluation of Some Underlying Assumptions 
 States seeking to regulate spam are thus faced with a dilemma.213 If 
their statutes are narrowly drafted to regulate only unsolicited com-
mercial e-mail, such statutes may be preempted by the CAN-SPAM Act, 
which deprives states of the ability to impose stricter requirements, 
tougher sanctions, or grant private rights of action to their citizens.214 
Even if regulations only concern false or misleading message informa-
tion, the narrow reading of the falsity exemption in Omega World Travel, 
Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc. may effectively render state anti-spam laws 
preempted.215 Such a narrow interpretation would permit deceptive 
subject lines and false sender addresses as long as the body of the spam 
                                                                                                                      
207 See id. at 314. 
208 See id. at 312. 
209 See id. at 313. 
210 See id. 
211 See Jaynes, 666 S.E.2d at 314. The court, drawing an analogy to the publication of 
the Federalist Papers, found that this statute would prohibit their dissemination by e-mail 
and that such expansive scope of the statute is unconstitutional. See id. 
212 See id. 
213 See Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 348, 359 (4th Cir. 
2006); Jaynes v. Commonwealth, 666 S.E.2d 303, 314 (Va. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1670 
(2009). 
214 See Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 359 (“[A]llowing a state to attach liability [through 
their spam statutes] would be inconsistent with the Federal Act . . . .”). 
215 See supra notes 142–154 and accompanying text. 
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contained some correct information, such as a mailing address where 
one could send requests to unsubscribe.216 
 Alternatively, if states draft broad statutes that escape preemption, 
they risk violating the First Amendment.217 Even legislation regulating 
false or misleading sender information may not be actionable because, 
as the Jaynes v. Commonwealth court noted, the right to engage in anony-
mous speech is constitutionally protected.218 Thus states that want to 
continue experimenting with novel approaches to safeguarding their 
citizens from spam need to exercise caution in drafting specific provi-
sions broad enough to be meaningful alongside the CAN-SPAM Act, 
while narrow enough to be constitutional.219 
A. Existing Options for Regulation 
1. The Choice Between Regulating Commercial and All Speech 
 The express preemption provision of the CAN-SPAM Act makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, for states to only regulate commercial e-mail 
without being preempted.220 Therefore, states that seek to protect their 
residents from the onslaught of spam may have greater success regulat-
ing all unsolicited e-mail rather than merely commercial e-mail.221 Such 
regulation will not be bound by the limitations of the CAN-SPAM Act if 
it can survive First Amendment scrutiny.222 
 Such all-encompassing statutes must be carefully drafted to avoid 
being overbroad.223 The Supreme Court of Virginia was troubled by the 
                                                                                                                      
216 See Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 359. Because of the instantaneous nature of e-mail 
communication, having to mail written requests to opt-out of further spam is unlikely to be 
effective and will impose further costs on the recipients. Cf. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office 
Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (upholding statute that allows removal of one’s name from 
a publisher’s mailing list via post because the Court “categorically reject[ed] the argument 
that a vendor has a right under the Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material 
into the home of another”). 
217 See Jaynes, 666 S.E.2d at 314 (“[The] statute is unconstitutionally overbroad on its 
face because it prohibits the anonymous transmission of all unsolicited bulk e-mails includ-
ing those . . . protected by the First Amendment . . . .”). 
218 See id. at 312 (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995)). 
219 See Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 359; Jaynes, 666 S.E.2d at 312. 
220 See 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(2)(B) (2006). 
221 See Dickinson, supra note 11, at 152–53. A beneficial side-effect of trying to regulate 
all, not just commercial, spam is that such laws could address all annoying unsolicited e-
mail because it is arguably the unsolicited nature of the e-mail that makes it a nuisance, 
not merely the fact that it is commercial. See id.; Memorandum from Deborah Fellows, 
supra note 3, at 5. 
222 See Jaynes, 666 S.E.2d at 314. 
223 See id. at 313. 
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fact that the statute in Jaynes would bar anonymous speech, because 
preserving anonymity in an e-mail necessarily involves falsifying the 
sender’s address.224 While the anonymous nature of spam makes en-
forcement more difficult, this aspect is not the main problem with re-
ceiving unsolicited e-mail.225 Both named and anonymous e-mail may, 
among other things, waste ISP resources, increase costs to the end-
users, and result in valuable e-mail going unnoticed.226 Thus, a statute 
seeking to regulate all spam should not make a distinction based on the 
anonymity of the sender.227 
 Additionally, instead of banning unsolicited e-mail altogether, 
states can attempt to merely regulate the time, place, and manner of 
the spam.228 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in analyz-
ing the government interest in regulating spam, suggested that if unso-
licited e-mail is a drain on computer server resources, it could be lim-
ited to certain times, such as off-peak hours.229 Furthermore, given the 
enormity of the spam problem and the availability of ample alternative 
channels for anonymous speech on the Internet, the government in-
terest in such regulations should be considered substantial.230 
2. Regulation in the Form of Consumer Protection 
 Alternatively, states seeking to regulate commercial e-mail may do 
so through their general consumer protection laws because the CAN-
SPAM Act expressly leaves state regulation of “acts of fraud or computer 
                                                                                                                      
224 See id. 
225 See 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3)–(4). But see 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(7)–(8) (suggesting that 
spammers include misleading information to induce recipients to view the message). 
226 See S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 7 (2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2353 (de-
tailing increased connection costs to consumers in remote areas and business travelers). 
227 See Jaynes, 666 S.E.2d at 314. 
228 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771 (1976) (“We have often approved [time, place, and manner] restrictions . . . provided 
that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they 
serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample al-
ternative channels for communication of the information.”). 
229 See White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Tex., 420 F.3d 366, 377 (5th Cir. 2005). At 
the very least such a regulation would allow individuals to prioritize important (solicited) e-
mail over unimportant (unsolicited) e-mail. See id. It may also result in lower access fees if the 
spam is downloaded and read during off-peak hours. Cf. S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 7. 
230 See e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, How to Blog Safely (About Work or Anything 
Else), http://www.eff.org/wp/blog-safely (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) (describing anonymous 
blogging). Blogs are simple, easy-to-use websites that the author updates periodically. See 
James Curry, Joining the Blogosphere, Popular Mechanics, June 2005, at 158. If Publius 
wanted to publish the Federalist Papers anonymously, he could have done so on his blog. Cf. 
Jaynes, 666 S.E.2d at 314. 
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crime” in place.231 By tying commercial e-mail to broader anti-fraud 
laws, states would be exempt from preemption by the federal act.232 Be-
cause the CAN-SPAM Act did not intend to displace comprehensive 
state anti-fraud and anti-computer crime law, statutes dealing with fraud 
and deception in e-mail do not raise the same concerns as statutes re-
quiring specific labeling, formatting, or other express e-mail regula-
tion.233 
 This carve-out may not allow the full range of remedies that states 
were free to impose on spam before the CAN-SPAM Act.234 The narrow 
interpretation of falsity and deception by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit—requiring material falsity in the offending e-mail— 
has a dual effect of making it easier to preempt state law while making 
it harder to establish a cause of action under the CAN-SPAM Act.235 
Such a narrow interpretation therefore creates more difficulty for 
plaintiffs to establish a cause of action under state fraud laws.236 Thus, 
the receiver of the spam in Mummagraphics was not entitled to relief 
under either the state or the federal statute when he alleged that by 
violating Oklahoma’s commercial e-mail laws, the unsolicited e-mail 
also violated Oklahoma’s consumer protection laws.237 The court noted 
that the CAN-SPAM Act’s preemption of state laws also meant that such 
claims could not give rise to subsequent violations of general state fraud 
and consumer protection laws.238 
3. States and State Agents as Internet Service Providers 
 Because of the conflict within the CAN-SPAM Act’s clauses, states 
may attempt to regulate spam through technological means in their 
capacity as ISPs, rather than through legislative means.239 State-run in-
stitutions, such as universities, provide Internet access to the public that 
they serve.240 Additionally, many cities, towns, and other municipalities 
                                                                                                                      
231 See 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(2)(B) (2006). 
232 See S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 22 (“[T]here would be no preemption of State laws that 
do not expressly regulate e-mail, such as State common law, general anti-fraud law, and 
computer crime law.”). 
233 See id. 
234 See Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 356. 
235 See supra notes 142–154 and accompanying text. 
236 See Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 353 n.1. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. 
239 See supra notes 155–170 and accompanying text. 
240 See White Buffalo, 420 F.3d at 373. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in White Buffalo 
expressly recognized that the University of Texas was an “Internet Access Provider” to its 
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are planning to offer wireless Internet access to residents and visitors.241 
The state as ISP can then create regulations designed to eliminate, or at 
least minimize, spam.242 Such regulations may be as drastic as blocking 
all e-mail from specific addresses, as the University of Texas did in White 
Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. University of Texas, or as mild as limiting unsolic-
ited e-mail to a particular time of day, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit suggested.243 Even less-restrictive regulations would 
have the desired effect of limiting spam by making it easier to catego-
rize and therefore eliminate.244 
 These less-restrictive alternatives laid out in the preceding parts 
may not fully solve the spam problem, however, because the use of such 
avenues to circumvent the CAN-SPAM Act depends on the courts inter-
pretation of the preemption clause in the Act.245 Furthermore, the strict 
scrutiny standard that courts apply in examining whether speech regula-
tion violates the First Amendment means that states may not be allowed 
to use blanket prohibitions on unsolicited e-mail.246 This notion, com-
bined with the recognized, albeit lesser, interest in protecting commer-
cial speech and the willingness by the courts to apply the overbreadth 
doctrine to spam, requires any solution to be very carefully crafted.247 
B. Challenging Assumptions About Spam 
 Legislatures drafting anti-spam legislation rely on assumptions 
about spammers and the nature of spam.248 If these assumptions are in-
                                                                                                                      
students and faculty, and therefore its regulation of unsolicited e-mail was not preempted 
by the CAN-SPAM Act. See id. 
241 See, e.g., Debra McCown, Free Wi-Fi Goes Live in Abingdon, Bristol Herald Courier 
(Va.), Oct. 2, 2008, http://www2.tricities.com/tri/news/local/article/wifi_goes_live_in_ 
abingdon/14562; Free Wireless Access, Albuquerque Official City Website, http://www.cabq. 
gov/wifi/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2009); see also Bailey, supra note 13, at 609–10. 
242 See White Buffalo, 420 F.3d at 369, 373. 
243 See id. at 377. 
244 See id. For example, a city providing Internet access, citing the desire to protect its 
network infrastructure from heavy load, could limit spam to off-peak hours, such as from 
one to four o’clock in the morning. See id. All e-mail arriving during these hours, unless 
from senders previously known to the recipient, would be flagged as spam. See id. Senders 
violating this provision could simply be blocked, which is exactly what the University of 
Texas was allowed to do under the CAN-SPAM Act. See id. 
245 See Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 353 & n.1, 354. 
246 See Jaynes, 666 S.E.2d at 313. 
247 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (finding that commer-
cial speech enjoys qualified but nonetheless substantial protection); see also City of Cincinnati 
v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (striking down commercial speech regulation 
that was not substantially related to the state interest). 
248 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (2006). 
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correct, however, resultant legislation is unlikely to be effective in com-
bating the spam problem.249 Reexamination of the underlying assump-
tions can create more powerful incentives to attack spam.250 
1. Spam Is Costly to Internet Service Providers 
 Most discussion and legislation concerning unsolicited e-mail as-
sume that the economic loss that ISPs suffer from spam will create in-
centives for them to help fight this problem.251 One reason Congress 
created a cause of action for ISPs in the CAN-SPAM Act is the belief 
that these large industry players would be able to fight spam more ef-
fectively than many individual recipients.252 And in fact, some large ISPs 
have gone after spammers.253 
 Still, this assumption may not be completely correct.254 If spam is a 
problem for all ISPs, they may be able to pass these costs onto consum-
ers without being economically hurt, and therefore the cost of spam 
may thus be factored into the cost of using e-mail in general.255 For in-
stance, connection and access fees for data downloaded, either by con-
nection time or by volume of data, are passed directly to the con-
sumer.256 Although paying to download spam is certainly frustrating to 
the consumer, it may create an increased profit for the service pro-
vider.257 Furthermore, the switch to broadband services and the growth 
of bandwidth-heavy content, such as video, make e-mail a relatively 
small component of the overall network traffic.258 
                                                                                                                      
249 See Soma et al., supra note 10, at 181. 
250 See infra notes 302–317 and accompanying text. 
251 See 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(6); S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 6 (2003), reprinted in 2004 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2352–53. 
252 See 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(1). 
253 See Mitch Wagner, AOL, Microsoft, and Yahoo Form Anti-Spam Alliance, Info. Week, Apr. 
28, 2003, available at http://www.informationweek.com/news/management/showArticle. 
jhtml?articleID=9400072 (“The alliance will focus on ways to block spam and will work with 
legal authorities on enforcement.”). 
254 See Soma et al., supra note 10, at 186–87. 
255 See S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 6 (citing reports that spam adds two dollars per month to 
individual users’ Internet bills); see also Soma et al., supra note 10, at 192–93 (suggesting 
that the marginal cost of transmitting spam is as low for ISPs as it is for spammers). 
256 See, e.g., Dialup Provider Options, Campus Info. Tech. & Educ. Servs., Univ. of Illi-
nois at Urbana-Champaign, http://www.cites.illinois.edu/dialup/isp_options.html (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
257 See S. Rep. No. 108-102, at 7 (citing effect on dial-up customers). 
258 See Ian Williams, Image Size Doubles Average File Size, Vnunet.com, Mar. 26, 2007, 
http://www.v3.co.uk/vnunet/news/2186424/image-spam-doubles-spam-file (noting an in-
crease in the size of an average e-mail message from six kilobytes (KB) to eleven KB). By con-
trast, the average size of a video file on YouTube is twelve megabytes (MB), roughly one thou-
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 Furthermore, ISPs may be able to profit from spam in a number of 
ways.259 By offering consumers superior spam protection, such as better 
filtering, ISPs are able to differentiate their services from those of other 
providers.260 The popularity of web-based e-mail programs, such as Ya-
hoo! and Google’s GMail, gives ISPs a way to harness the extra time us-
ers spend on their websites due to spam.261 These e-mail providers are 
able to display other advertisements inside their e-mail applications, 
and even target these ads to the content of the e-mail being checked, 
including spam.262 
 Thus, the fundamental assumption about the behavior of ISPs in 
combating spam may be unfounded.263 ISPs may choose to act only in 
the most egregious cases, failing to bring enforcement actions against 
less malicious spammers even though they have been granted such 
power by the CAN-SPAM Act.264 Therefore, viewing ISPs as allies in the 
crusade against spam may be a mistake.265 
2. Only Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail Is Harmful and Annoying 
 Another fundamental assumption made in the spam discussion is 
that it is spam’s commercial nature that is causing problems.266 While 
commercial spam in undoubtedly annoying, and oftentimes more likely 
to be fraudulent, other types of spam are not made any less annoying 
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by their noncommercial nature.267 Spam that makes appeals for charity 
or political commentary is no more solicited than offers of miracle 
products or time-share deals.268 
 The nature of the spam, whether commercial or not, does not af-
fect the reasons why spam is problematic.269 Any type of spam still cre-
ates more Internet traffic and increases the load on ISP resources.270 
Furthermore, noncommercial spam also forces recipients to spend 
time sorting their e-mail, causes legitimate messages to be drowned out 
in the sea of spam, and may even contain computer viruses.271 Non-
commercial spam, however, is outside the scope of the CAN-SPAM Act, 
as well as a number of state laws.272 Because religious or political speech 
has typically enjoyed strong First Amendment protection, legislators 
may be afraid to target spam of that nature.273 
 Because spam is being sent directly to recipients, most often in 
their homes, any First Amendment concerns start coming into conflict 
with the sanctity that the home has typically enjoyed in American juris-
prudence.274 Thus, the general rule that the burden is on the viewer to 
avert their eyes from unwanted speech does not apply to unwanted 
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speech in the home, where the recipient of the speech constitutes a 
“captive audience.”275 Although the government may not be able to 
initiate the blocking of unwanted material, it should be able to regulate 
the time, place, and manner of all unsolicited bulk e-mail in the home 
without great constitutional difficulties.276 
3. Tough Spam Regulation Will Make Spammers Move Abroad 
 The assumption that spammers will move overseas is frequently 
raised in response to proposals to regulate domestic companies.277 Al-
though there are significant amounts of spam coming from overseas, this 
argument is not as persuasive as it seems.278 The United States is cur-
rently responsible for the largest percentage of all spam: twenty-seven 
percent.279 Spammers need access to the telecommunications infrastruc-
ture in order to send spam, and foreign locations with antiquated or un-
reliable Internet connections are unlikely to be attractive to them.280 Fur-
thermore, there is no guarantee that other countries will be receptive to 
spammers.281 
 A recent example illustrates this proposition: McColo, a U.S.-based 
web-hosting firm located in California, was forced offline after convinc-
ing evidence surfaced that it was responsible for as much as seventy-five 
percent of spam.282 The Internet providers that connected McColo to 
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the rest of the Internet severed its connections, and e-mail users imme-
diately noticed a significant drop in spam.283 McColo was also believed 
to be involved in other aspects of cyber-crime, including fake pharmacy 
sites, child pornography, and running “botnets” —networks of virus 
infected “zombie” computers that are used to send spam.284 The ISPs 
used by McColo are large, dedicated companies with their own high-
speed connections—the kind that may be harder to find overseas.285 
IV. Judicial and Legislative Proposals to Encourage More 
Effective Spam Regulation 
 The lack of authentication in e-mail messaging protocols, the inex-
pensive nature of bulk e-mail communication, the ineffectiveness of 
strictly technological solutions to unsolicited e-mail, and the confusing 
jumble of state and federal law have created the “perfect storm” for 
spam.286 It is likely that adequate solutions will not come quickly and, 
when they do, will involve a mix of legislative and technological ap-
proaches.287 Because spam is a relatively new phenomenon, many po-
tential solutions must be created, implemented, tested, and evaluated 
for effectiveness.288 Therefore, the courts and legislatures should initially 
proceed with caution.289 The following suggestions address how each 
branch may want to consider approaching the problem. 
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A. Breathing Room for State Regulation 
 Courts must recognize the value in allowing states to augment the 
provisions of the CAN-SPAM Act for handling unsolicited e-mail.290 Dif-
ferent states are going to be responsive to different constituencies and 
this diversity may not fully manifest itself on the national level.291 
Therefore, when faced with different options for applying various anti-
spam laws, courts should pick the approach that creates significant op-
portunity for experimentation.292 At the same time, courts must be 
careful not to retread the regulatory schemes previously ruled out by 
either Congress or the FTC.293 
1. A Broader Reading of Exemption 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s narrow reading 
of the preemption provision of the CAN-SPAM Act effectively suppresses 
any novel approaches that states may wish to investigate.294 Other 
courts—those not bound by Fourth Circuit precedent—should inter-
pret the preemption provision more broadly.295 Such breathing room 
will allow states to fine-tune their anti-fraud and computer-crime laws to 
find the ones most effective at fighting spam.296 At the same time, the 
courts must be mindful of the original purposes of the CAN-SPAM Act 
and ensure that frivolous litigation does not become as prevalent as 
spam itself.297 
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2. Requirement of Substantial Overbreadth 
 The courts must also provide constitutional breathing room for e-
mail regulation by respecting the requirement that any overbreadth be 
substantial.298 The overbreadth must not only be “substantial in the abso-
lute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”299 
Because the overwhelming majority of spam is commercial or fraudulent 
in nature, any minute amount of political or religious spam cannot rise 
to the level of substantiality required by the overbreadth doctrine.300 Fur-
thermore, the negative associations recipients have formed from fraudu-
lent, commercial, and obscene spam have effectively “poisoned the well” 
for any legitimate political or religious messages sent via e-mail.301 
B. A Realignment of Legislative Incentives 
 Legislators should adjust the anti-spam statutes by taking into ac-
count the current judicial interpretation of existing statutes as well as 
the changing nature of the underlying assumptions.302 Better incentives 
for warriors in the battle against spam should help to achieve a greater 
victory.303 
1. Clarifying the State-as-ISP Loophole 
 The CAN-SPAM Act’s potential loophole allows states acting as 
ISPs to regulate spam with less restrictions than Congress may have in-
tended.304 Because this loophole would allow various state instrumen-
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talities to have different sets of laws, compliance with any particular law 
would be difficult, given the nature of e-mail.305 Such a loophole may 
therefore undermine the uniformity that Congress aimed to achieve by 
creating national legislation in the CAN-SPAM Act.306 Conversely, Con-
gress should clearly announce its intent if it wants to allow those state 
actors and municipalities that operate ISPs to experiment with various 
spam fighting techniques.307 Such experimentation may help to create 
the breathing room that effective solutions to spam require.308 
2. Realigning Incentives for Internet Service Providers 
 If ISPs lack incentive to reduce spam and spammers are unlikely to 
move to remote locations due to their reliance on high-bandwidth 
Internet connections, the view of ISPs’ role in the fight against spam 
should be modified.309 ISPs cannot be seen as allies if they have no in-
centive to rein in unsolicited e-mail, or worse, are actively contributing 
to spam.310 Therefore, states may be justified in regulating ISPs, such as 
McColo, to prevent them from either intentionally or inadvertently con-
tributing to the volume of spam.311 The threat of heavy criminal and 
financial sanctions should dissuade malicious ISPs, like McColo, from 
engaging in spamming and spam-promoting activities.312 
3. A Bounty System to Target Rogue Internet Service Providers 
 At the same time, funds from sanctioning the violations can be 
used to create an incentive system to reward cooperating ISPs and 
other investigative bodies in their efforts to curb spam.313 The resulting 
system would be similar to the bounty system proposed by Lawrence 
Lessig, but without some of the negative factors highlighted in the 
FTC’s report.314 Because the hunt for the individual spammer is hin-
dered by the anonymity of the Internet, shifting the focus away from 
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them and instead to spam-promoting and contributing ISPs should as-
sist the battle against spam.315 ISPs are in a better position to fight spam 
because they are closer to the source of the spam and are able to gather 
greater and more meaningful information about the spammers from 
their networks than individual recipients could.316 Enforcement would 
thus fall on larger web-hosting companies, which are not only essential 
to spammers, but also able to more effectively combat unsolicited e-
mail.317 
Conclusion 
 The problem of unsolicited e-mail is a fairly recent phenomenon. 
E-mail’s popularity, coupled with the low cost, lack of authentication, 
and relative anonymity of the medium has fueled the growth of spam, 
which now threatens to severely curtail usefulness of the very medium 
that spawned it. Neither technological nor legislative solutions have 
been able to reverse the trend thus far. In fact, the complexity of the 
interaction between state and federal law in this area makes enforce-
ment of any provisions more difficult. 
 Because no single approach to this problem has proven to be suc-
cessful, state legislatures tackling the spam problem need to carefully 
draft legislation to augment, rather than compete with, the Federal 
CAN-SPAM Act. At the same time the courts, in interpreting the over-
lap between state and federal legislation, need to give some “breath-
ing room” to state laws seeking to curtail spam. The assumption that 
only commercial spam should be regulated must be reexamined in 
light of the fact that if spam is allowed to grow at its current pace, it 
may effectively destroy e-mail as a communications medium by ren-
dering it useless. 
 Additionally, states must focus on effective ways of combating spam 
by creating systems that properly align the incentives for all the parties 
involved in this problem, including the ISPs. Addressing the problem 
of spam by state regulation of ISPs appears both more promising and 
less encumbered by federal limitations. States must ensure, however, 
that such legislation is neither preempted by the CAN-SPAM Act nor 
precluded by constitutional limitations. 
Igor Helman 
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